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Abstract. By now the importance of literacy in the process of development
is widely accepted. However, unlike measuring welfare or inequality, the prob-
lem of literacy measurement remains largely unexamined. Alternatives to the
standard literacy rate, R, equal to the number of literate adults as a per-
centage of the adult population, are not well known, but this measure has
its deﬁciencies. In particular, several authors have identiﬁed the externality
accruing to proximate illiterates, that is, illiterate people with access to a lit-
erate person. The standard literacy rate ignores this externality; measures
of eﬀective literacy are sensitive to it. The present note oﬀers two eﬀective
literacy rates (measures) and a set of axioms characterizing each. Nearly all
measures of eﬀective literacy appearing in the literature are greater than or
equal to R. In fact, the best known of these, the Basu-Foster measure L∗,
is strictly greater in virtually every case (see Basu and Foster [1]). Although
the inequality L∗ ≥ R is an unintended consequence of their construction,
it amounts to setting a benchmark for the eﬀective literacy rate. This notes
examines Basu and Foster’s framework and oﬀers an alternative benchmark.
1. Introduction
The standard literacy rate, R, equal to the number of literate adults as a per-
centage of the adult population, is the only widely-used measure of literacy, in
spite of the fact that it ignores signiﬁcant aspects of literacy. In particular, sev-
eral authors1 have identiﬁed an externality accruing to the illiterate members of
households which include at least one literate member, so called proximate illiter-
ate people. Empirical evidence suggests this externality is large (see John Gibson
[5]).
Measures of literacy which are sensitive to the intrahousehold externality are
termed measures of eﬀective literacy. There is a growing literature on the construc-
tion and characterization of such measures, beginning with Basu and Foster [1].
Their measure L∗ is R+αP, where P is the proximate illiteracy rate (percentage of
proximate illiterate adults in the adult population) and α is a real number strictly
between zero and one. From this formulation, it is clear that L∗ is greater than or
equal to R. In fact L∗ > R for any society which includes a proximate illiterate
person. This result is a consequence, not an assumption, of their axiomatic ap-
proach (more on this observation below), and yet adopting L∗ to measure literacy
amounts to setting a benchmark for the eﬀective literacy rate, namely L∗ ≥ R.
In addition, it is arguable that adopting L∗, in place of the traditional R, raises
practical concerns. Since L∗ is greater than R, adopting L∗ results in an immediate
Date: September 5, 2007.
I wish to thank Kaushik Basu for comments and discussion. Any remaining errors are my own.
1See, for example, Basu and Foster [1]; John Gibson [5]; Green, Rich, and Nesman [6]; and
Bryan Maddox [8].
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increase in the perceived literacy rate and a consequent sense of improvement, all
without any real change taking place.
Other authors have extended Basu and Foster’s ideas. Indranil Dutta [3], S. Sub-
ramanian [11], and Paola Valenti [12]) have given measures for which the extent of
the externality depends on the rate of literacy within each household. In almost
every case, the proposed measure of literacy is bounded below by the standard lit-
eracy rate. Additional authors have oﬀered further extensions (see Basu, Narayan,
and Ravallion [2] and Tapan Mitra [10]), but the problem of benchmarking remains
unresolved.
For these reasons, there has been interest in obtaining new measures of eﬀective
literacy, L, which are sensitive to the intrahousehold externality but which satisfy
the opposite benchmark, that is L ≤ R. This note oﬀers two such measures and a
set of axioms characterizing each. These measures are L1 = R − αI for α > 0 and
L2 = (1−αI)R for 0 < α ≤ 1, where I is the percentage of isolated illiterate adults
(illiterate adults who are not proximate).
S. Subramanian has already derived the measure of literacy (1 − I)R from dif-
ferent motivations [11]. He provides an interesting characterization of (1−I)R as a
function of R and a measure of eﬃciency loss I/(1−R) satisfying certain properties.
An alternate axiomatic characterization is provided here, and the presence of α in
L2 = (1 − αI)R may permit empirical comparisons.
Section 2 introduces the Basu-Foster axiomatic framework and their measure
L∗. This section serves as a starting point for exploring the consistency of their
framework with other possible benchmarks. Sections 3 and 4 concern the new
measures L1 and L2 respectively. The main result, theorem 1, characterizes L2.
2. Notation and Axioms
Borrowing from [1], denote by ∆ the set of all societies, where x ∈ ∆ is a (ﬁnite-
length) vector of households x = (x1,...,xm). In turn, each xh is a (ﬁnite-length)
vector of ones and zeroes, denoting literate and illiterate members of household
h respectively. An illiterate person (denoted by a zero in some xh) is proximate
illiterate if his or her household xh includes at least one literate member. Otherwise
he or she is isolated illiterate; that is, an illiterate person is isolated illiterate if his
or her household includes no literate members. Thus a household x1 = (1,0,0)
includes one literate and two proximate illiterate members, while the household
x2 = (0,0,0) consists of three isolated illiterate people. A household will be called
literate if it includes a literate member and illiterate otherwise.
Throughout rx,px, and ix denote the number of literate, proximate illiterate,
and isolated illiterate people in a society x. By the same token, R,P, and I denote
the relative frequencies of these groups, that is R(x) = rx/nx, P(x) = px/nx,
and I(x) = ix/nx, where the symbol nx denotes the total number of people in
x. The number of households in x is denoted mx, and the size of household h is
nh. Although the notation n1 may refer to either the population of society 1 or
the number of members of household 1, the context will make clear which meaning
is intended. In fact the subscripts x and h in nx, mx, nh, rx, px, and ix will be
dropped when there is no ambiguity.
Basu and Foster give ﬁve axioms which characterize their measure of literacy L∗.
Quoting from [1], their axioms are as follows:BENCHMARKING THE EFFECTIVE LITERACY RATE 3
Axiom A (Anonymity): If x ∈ ∆ is obtained from y ∈ ∆ by either a permutation
of households or a permutation of individuals within a household, then L(x) = L(y).
Society x is obtained from society y by a simple increment if for some (h,j)
xh
j = 1 and yh




j0 for all (h0,j0) 6= (h,j).
Axiom M (Monotonicity): If x ∈ ∆ is obtained from y ∈ ∆ by a simple incre-
ment, then L(x) > L(y).
Society x is obtained from society y by a household split if y has m households,
x has m+1 households, ym is the concatenation of xm and xm+1, and xh = yh for
all other households h = 1,...,m − 1. The split is externality-neutral if either (i)
both xm and xm+1 contain a literate person or (ii) neither of xm or xm+1 contain
a literate person. It is called externality-reducing if exactly one of xm or xm+1
contains a literate person.
Axiom E (Externality): Suppose x ∈ ∆ is obtained from y ∈ ∆ by household
split. If the split is externality-neutral, then L(x) = L(y); and if the split is
externality-reducing, then L(x) < L(y).
A society x is completely literate if xh
j = 1 for all h and j; x is completely illiterate
if xh
j = 0 for all h and j.
Axiom N (Normalization): If x ∈ ∆ is completely literate, then L(x) = 1; if
x ∈ ∆ is completely illiterate, then L(x) = 0.
Society x is decomposed into societies y and z if yh = xh for all h = 1,...,my
and zh = xh+my for all h = 1,...,mz, where my + mz = mx.
Axiom D (Decomposition): Suppose x ∈ ∆ is decomposed into y ∈ ∆ and
z ∈ ∆. Then L(x) = (ny/nx)L(y) + (nz/nx)L(z).
Any measure of literacy satisfying these ﬁve axioms is L∗ = R + αP for some
0 < α < 1. Obviously this measure is sensitive to the “the intrahousehold exter-
nality arising from the presence of a literate member” [1] through the parameter α.
Essentially literate people contribute to this measure a value of one over the size
of the population (as with the standard measure R) and, in addition, proximate
illiterate people contribute α over the size of the population.
The inequality L∗ ≥ R is a consequence of axioms A, D, E, and N as follows:
if x is a single household consisting of r ≥ 0 literate and i ≥ 0 illiterate members,
then for any measure of literacy L satisfying these axioms

















where the inequality holds by axioms A and E, the ﬁrst equality by axiom D,
and the second by axiom N. Since both L and R satisfy axiom D, it follows that
L(x) ≥ R(x) for all societies x.
Thus the measure L∗ implicitly assumes a benchmark for the eﬀective literacy
rate, namely L∗ ≥ R; however there are other options. The two measures given
below satisfy the polar opposite benchmark, that is L ≤ R. It is possible to imagine4 TRAVIS LEE
additional measures of literacy which exceed R on some societies and fall below it
on others. One could even devise a measure which is calibrated to match a region’s
standard literacy rate at a given point in time, with the complication that all future
literacy comparisons between regions must account for this calibration.2
There are some practical reasons for concern that L∗ ≥ R. Although switching
to a new measure causes no change in literacy, reporting a new, higher “rate of lit-
eracy” creates a perception of improvement in literacy attainment. Hence reporting
the new measure may ease pressure on policy makers to aﬀect change. Examples
of the misuse of statistics, particularly in questions of public policy, are plentiful;
see, for instance, Mark Maier [9] and Jaﬀe and Spirer [7].
Since the externality axiom is essential to capturing the externality accruing
to proximate illiterate members of literate households, and the anonymity axiom
seems the least controversial, one is forced to consider measures L violating either
the decomposition or normalization axioms in order to achieve the new benchmark
L ≤ R.
3. Nixing Normalization
As observed in the previous section, L∗(x) ≥ R(x) for all x ∈ ∆. One might ask
what conditions are necessary to achieve the new benchmark L(x) ≤ R(x). The
previous section explained why it is necessary to dispense with either axiom D or N.
This section considers measures of literacy which violate the normalization axiom.
What other restrictions, if any, are imposed by the new benchmark?
By axioms E and D respectively, L(0,...,0) = L((0),...,(0)) = 1
n · n · L(0) =
L(0), where n is the number of members of the one-household society (0,...,0).
The same argument shows L(1,...,1) = L(1). Then given any one-household
society x with r literate and p illiterate members, axioms A and E, axiom D, and
the preceding computations respectively imply













If L satisﬁes axiom N, then L(x) ≥ r
n = R(x). Again we see that it is necessary to
do without this axiom. Notice if L(1) = 1, then L(x) ≥ R(x)+
p
nL(0) and L(0) < 0
is a necessary condition for L to satisfy the new benchmark.3 Now we are ready to
formulate the new benchmark in the following axiom.
Axiom B (Benchmark): If x ∈ ∆ has no isolated illiterate members, then L(x) =
R(x).4
If L satisﬁes both axioms B and E, it is immediate that L(x) < R(x) when x
includes at least one isolated illiterate member. Notice L∗(x) ≥ R(x) for all x ∈ ∆,
and L∗(x) = R(x) exactly when society x includes no proximate illiterate members.
The new benchmark has been deﬁned in a precisely analogous way. This particular
2James Foster originated this idea for a solution.
3In fact there are various ways to go about weakening axiom N. The inequality L ≤ R and
axioms A, D, E, and N together imply L(x) = fL(R(x)) where f : [0,1] → (−∞,1] is strictly
increasing and fL(ρ) ≤ ρ for all ρ ∈ [0,1]. The main text considers the case where, in addition,
fL(1) = 1.
4Technically it is unnecessary to explicitly mention the standard literacy rate since R is equiva-
lent to axioms A, D, I, and N, where axiom I requires a measure to be indiﬀerent to the externality
enjoyed by the proximate illiterate. However the axiom seems more transparent in its current form.BENCHMARKING THE EFFECTIVE LITERACY RATE 5
formulation has the consequence that L(x) < 0 for any completely illiterate society
x. However as shown above, this restriction is already implied by axioms A, D, E,
and L(1) = 1. Another version of the benchmark axiom is given in the following
section.
As the next proposition shows, axioms A, B, D, and E fully characterize a new
measure of literacy L1 = R − αI, where α > 0.
Proposition 1. A measure of literacy L : ∆ → R satisﬁes axioms A, B, D, and E
if and only if L = L1 for some α > 0.
Proof. L1 is simply an aﬃne transformation of L∗. To see this, set α0 = α/(1 + α)
and make the following computation:
L1 + α = R − αI + α = R − α(1 − R − P) + α = (1 + α)R + αP.
Hence (L1 +α)/(1+α) = L∗
α0, where L∗
α0 = R+α0P is the Basu-Foster measure of
literacy L∗ with parameter α0. So L1 satisﬁes axioms A, D, and E. (By the same
reasoning L1 satisﬁes axiom M.) It is clear that L1 satisﬁes axiom B since α > 0.
Conversely suppose L : ∆ → R satisﬁes axioms A, B, D, and E. Let x be any
society, written x = (x1,...,xl,xl+1,...,xh) where household xk is literate for
k = 1,...,l, and illiterate for k = l+1,...,h. By axiom A, this rearranging has no
eﬀect on L(x). As shown above, axioms A, B, D, and E imply there is some α > 0
such that L(0) = −α.
Then axioms A, D, and B plus L(0) = −α respectively imply



























= R(x) − αI(x).
Therefore L = L1 with parameter α > 0. 
As mentioned in the course of the preceding proof, L1 also satisﬁes axiom M.
Thus it meets all the Basu-Foster axioms, except N, and fulﬁlls the new benchmark
L1 ≤ R.
4. Dropping Decomposition
A legitimate criticism of the measure L1 is that it can take negative values, in
violation of axiom N (more precisely axioms M and N imply 0 ≤ L(x) ≤ 1 for
all x ∈ ∆). Equation 2.1 exhibits the impossibility of ﬁnding a measure of liter-
acy meeting the new benchmark and satisfying axioms A, D, E, and N. To ﬁnd
a measure respecting the intrahousehold externality, it is essential to keep axiom
E. In addition axiom A is arguably the most reasonable and least controversial
requirement. As the previous section concerned measures violating normalization,
this section considers measures violating decomposition. The following is a refor-
mulation of the benchmark axiom which is compatible with axiom N.
Axiom Q (Qualiﬁed Benchmark): If x ∈ ∆ has no isolated illiterate members
or x is completely illiterate, then L(x) = R(x).
One might ask whether there is a measure of literacy satisfying axioms A, E,
N, and Q, and, if so, whether it is uniquely determined. As shown below, L2 =6 TRAVIS LEE
(1 − αI)R meets these conditions when 0 ≤ α < 1. So does L0 = (1 − 1.5I)R,
although it violates axiom M. For 0 ≤ α < 1, however, L00 = (1 − αI2)R satisﬁes
axioms A, E, N, and Q, and monotonicity as well.5 As these examples illustrate, it
is necessary to impose additional constraints in order to uniquely characterize L2.
To set the stage, let L be any measure of literacy satisfying axioms A and E,
and let x be any society. Then L(x) = L(˜ x1, ˜ x2) where the households ˜ x1 and ˜ x2
are the concatenations of all the literate and illiterate households in x respectively.
Then ˜ x1 consists of r literate and p proximate illiterate members, while ˜ x2 is a
household of i illiterate people. In other words,
L(x) = L((1,...,1,0,...,0),(0,...,0)).
As this equation makes clear, L(x) is determined by r,p, and i. (Of course popula-
tion size is n = r + p + i.) With this fact in mind, we will write L(x) = fL(r,p,i),
where fL is simply the function of these three variables which determines L. More
formally, denote by Z+ = {0,1,2,...} the set of nonnegative integers and by
∆ = {(r,p,i) : r,p,i ∈ Z+} the set of societies written as ordered triples. Then fL
is a particular function from ∆ to R.
One way to impose an additional constraint on a measure L satisfying axioms A
and E is to require a certain relationship between fL(r,p,i) and fL(r,p + 1,i − 1),
provided i ≥ 1. On this note, consider the following axiom.
Axiom L (Linearity): If x ∈ ∆, then L(x) is uniquely determined by r,p, and
i. In other words L(x) = fL(r,p,i) for some function fL : ∆ → R. Furthermore,
whenever r ≥ 1 and i ≥ 2,
fL(r,p + 2,i − 2) − fL(r,p + 1,i − 1) = fL(r,p + 1,i − 1) − fL(r,p,i) > 0.
People who are isolated illiterate in a society x reduce L(x) for any measure of
literacy L satisfying axiom E. In other words, moving an isolated illiterate person
into a literate household produces a gain in the literacy measure. Intuitively the
new axiom says the same increase in the eﬀective literacy rate is obtained from
moving the ﬁrst, second, third, and so on, isolated illiterate person into a literate
household.
The axiom does not say the increase in eﬀective literacy obtained by moving one
isolated illiterate person into a literate household is the same for all societies. In
other words, if x,y ∈ ∆ with rx,ry ≥ 1 and ix,iy ≥ 2, it may be that
fL(rx,px + 1,ix − 1) − fL(rx,px,ix) 6= fL(ry,py + 1,iy − 1) − fL(ry,py,iy).
In fact if L also satisﬁes axiom Q, it is easy to see that
fL(rx,px + 1,ix − 1) − fL(rx,px,ix) = (1/ix)(R(x) − L(x))
so the gain depends on the number of isolated illiterate people in a given society.
As shown above, L(x) = fL(r,p,i) is already implied by axioms A and E. Thus
for any measure satisfying these two axioms, only the second part of axiom L,
5This example illustrates an additional point. The literacy measures considered here, as well
as many of those considered elsewhere, are polynomial functions in the society-wide per capita
rates of literacy, proximate illiteracy, and isolated illiteracy. Thus many of the supporting axioms
can be reformulated as conditions on these polynomials. Exceptions include works by I. Dutta
[3], S. Subramanian [11], and P. Valenti [12], all of whom consider measures in which the size of
the externality accruing to a proximate illiterate person depends on the distribution of literacy
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concerning linearity, is new. Conversely a little thought shows axiom L implies the
anonymity and externality axioms. The stipulation r ≥ 1 permits L(x) = 0 when
x is completely illiterate.
Axiom L strengthens axiom E by requiring the eﬀective literacy rate to increase
linearly as any given society x (with r ≥ 1 and i ≥ 2) moves to a society resembling
x except that isolated illiteracy has been eliminated. Axiom L is quite strong,
but it is meant to formalize a strong idea, namely that the externality accruing to
proximate illiteracy be measured in a linear fashion.6
Theorem 1. A measure of literacy L : ∆ → R satisﬁes axioms A, L, N, and Q if
and only if L = L2 for some 0 < α ≤ 1.
Proof. Since L2 = (1 − αI)R, it is easy to check that it satisﬁes axioms A, N, and
Q. (L2 also satisﬁes the monotonicity axiom.) In fact









where n is an abbreviation for r + p + i. Further if r ≥ 1 and 0 < k ≤ i, then
fL(r,p + k,i − k) − fL(r,p + k − 1,i − k + 1) =
αr
n
so L2 satisﬁes axiom L.
Conversely suppose L satisﬁes these axioms. By axiom N, L(x) = 0 for any
completely illiterate society x. Now suppose x ∈ ∆ includes at least one literate
member. Let ˆ x2 be any literate household in x, and let ˆ x1 be the concatenation
of all the other literate households. Lastly let ˆ x3 = (0ix) be the concatenation
of all the illiterate households where 0k denotes a ﬁnite sequence of k illiterate
individuals. Then by axioms A and L, there is an α > 0 such that




where (ˆ x2,0k) is a single household which is the concatenation of ˆ x2 and k illiterate
individuals. By the linearity axiom, L(x) = L(ˆ x1,(ˆ x2,0k),(0ix−k)) − αk
n R(x) for
any k ≤ ix, and in particular
L(x) = L(ˆ x1,(ˆ x2,0ix)) −
αix
n
R(x) = R(x) − αI(x)R(x),
where the last equality follows by axiom Q. Axiom N guarantees α ≤ 1. Thus
L = L2 for some 0 < α ≤ 1. 
Axiom D has proved extremely useful in practice. Although L2 does not satisfy
axiom D, it is possible to make similar computations. In fact if x is the concatena-








6Writing down the precise constraints imposed by this idea requires some attention to ﬁne
detail, but a little thought makes clear that it imposes numerous restrictions, such as, for example,
L((1,0),(1,0)) = L((1,0,0),(1)).8 TRAVIS LEE
This formula7 gives a decomposition of the literacy rate as a weighted sum where,
admittedly, the weights are more complicated than in axiom D. Note that to com-
pute L2 for some region, it is necessary to know both L2, R, and population size for
each subregion. Thus L2 satisﬁes one particular decomposability axiom, of which
there are many. In [4], James Foster and Amartya Sen give a detailed survey of
decomposability in the context of measuring inequality.
As mentioned in the introduction, S. Subramanian [11] gives an interesting char-
acterization of R(1−I) as a function of R and a an eﬃciency loss indicator I/(1−R).
Similarly the measure L2 is a function of R and a slightly more general indicator of
eﬃciency loss Q0 = αI/(1 − R), for 0 < α ≤ 1. This generalization is hardly worth
mentioning, except that the presence of 0 < α ≤ 1 may provide the opportunity
for an empirical comparison of L∗ and L2 (see, for example, Gibson [5]).
5. Summary
This note oﬀers two measures of literacy which account for the positive exter-
nality arising from proximate illiteracy. Both are less than or equal to the standard
measure of literacy R. Furthermore each measure is characterized by a set of ax-
ioms.
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